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Executive summary
Compared to previous attempts, especially those following the Orange Revolution in 
2004, the current reform round in Ukraine (since 2014) has proved more successful. Some 
politically difficult decisions have been taken, such as the elimination of gas subsidies and 
the restructuring of the banking system. But reform remains incomplete in many important 
areas, such as local and regional self-government, public administration, the judiciary, law 
enforcement agencies, the energy sector and infrastructure, the pension system, privatisation 
and land ownership. 
Since near-disaster in February 2015, Ukraine’s macroeconomic situation has stabilised. 
The economy stopped declining in 2016. However, macroeconomic stability remains fragile 
and the recovery of 2016-17 looks rather weak given the scale of the previous decline.
The window of political opportunity created by regime change and the mobilisation 
against external aggression in 2014-15 has not been used effectively as a springboard for 
reforming the dysfunctional Ukrainian economy and state. The window of opportunity now 
seems to be closing as Ukraine approaches a new electoral cycle in 2018-19. 
The external players, in particular, the International Monetary Fund, the European Un-
ion and the United States, have provided Ukraine with a substantial balance-of-payments and 
budgetary support, along with technical assistance. In addition, the EU opened its markets to 
Ukrainian exports and granted visa-free travel to Ukrainian citizens. However, the macroeco-
nomic assumptions behind the IMF programmes have been too optimistic, and the IMF and 
the EU have not always set the right reform priorities.
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1 Introduction
Ukraine has been a focus of European and global political attention since 2013. The dramat-
ic events of the Euromaidan in Kyiv (also called the ‘Revolution of Dignity’) resulted in the 
collapse of the regime of president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. This was followed by 
the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and military intervention in Donbas shortly 
after, events that have undermined post-Cold War geopolitical order in Europe and created a 
serious challenge to regional security. Despite the Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 ceasefire agreements 
(in September 2014 and February 2015 respectively), the conflict has continued with varying 
intensity, and multiplying human victims and material losses. 
Less in the spotlight, however, the new Ukrainian leadership, which emerged after Euro-
maidan, has been engaged in a struggle to reform the dysfunctional Ukrainian state and its 
poorly performing economy. Sadly, the economic and political transition since 1991, when 
Ukraine became independent, cannot be considered a success story, despite several reform 
attempts (see Dabrowski, 2007 and 2014, for an historical overview). 
However, the question arises of whether the dramatic events of 2013-17 have helped to 
consolidate Ukraine’s society and political class to the extent that the modernisation of the 
country’s economic and political systems could be enabled, laying the foundations for rapid 
economic growth and stable liberal democracy in future. 
In our opinion, there is no unequivocal answer to this question. Compared to previous 
attempts, especially those following the Orange Revolution in 2004, the current reform round 
has proved more successful and some politically difficult decisions have been taken (for 
example, the elimination of gas subsidies). But reform remains incomplete in many impor-
tant areas, such as local and regional self-government, the judiciary, law enforcement agen-
cies, privatisation and land ownership. Worse, the window of political opportunity created 
by regime change and the mobilisation against external aggression in 2014-15 seems to be 
closing. Ukraine is approaching a new electoral cycle in 2018-19. 
This Policy Contribution analyses the Ukrainian economic, institutional and political 
reforms of 2014-17 in terms of their sustainability and completeness, and evaluates what 
remains to be done (sections 2 and 3). We also discuss the political economy and politics of 
the reform process, including the role of external players such as the Bretton Woods institu-
tions and the European Union (sections 4 and 5), before summarising the political lessons 
(section 6). 
2 Economic policy and reforms
2.1 Macroeconomic challenges
In 2014-15, Ukraine’s economy experienced a steep output decline and deep macroeco-
nomic imbalances caused by a combination of populist policies and the hostile business 
climate of the Yanukovych’s era, political uncertainty during and after the Euromaidan, 
Russian intervention and economic sanctions, and the decline in international metal prices 
in 2014. The first round of currency and financial crisis in spring 2014 was temporarily 
arrested with the help of the International Monetary Fund Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) 
(IMF, 2014). However, because of various shortcomings of the SBA (Dabrowski, 2014), slow 
movement on reform by the new Ukrainian authorities, the decline in commodity prices 
and, most importantly, the escalation of the conflict in Donbas, the key underlying cause of 
macroeconomic crisis – the fiscal imbalance – was not tackled. This has led to a new round 
of macroeconomic crises since October 2014. The situation became particularly dramatic 
in January and February 2015 (Dabrowski, 2015) when the international reserves of the 
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National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) were largely depleted and the hryvna’s value against the 
dollar collapsed (Figures 1 and 2). 
Figure 1: Ukraine: gross international reserves in $ billions, end-of-month, 2014-17
Source: http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=46950.
Since the near-disaster in February 2015, the macroeconomic situation has stabilised 
and the economy stopped declining in 2016. However, macroeconomic stability remains 
fragile and the recovery of 2016-17 looks rather weak given the scale of the previous decline 
(Table 1). There is little chance that two-digit inflation can be reduced to a low single-digit 
level soon. The economy continues to be heavily dollarised1, reflecting limited public trust 
in the hryvna. 
Table 1: Ukraine: basic macroeconomic indicators, 2012-2016
Indicator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP, annual change in % 0.2 0.0 -6.6 -9.8 2.3
Inflation, % -0.2 0.5 24.9 43.3 12.4
General govt. revenue, % of GDP 44.7 43.3 40.3 41.9 38.4
General govt. total expenditure, % of GDP 49.0 48.1 44.8 43.0 40.6
General govt. balance, % of GDP -4.3 -4.8 -4.5 -1.2 -2.2
General govt. gross debt, % of GDP 37.5 40.5 70.3 79.3 81.2
Current account balance, % of GDP -8.1 -9.2 -3.9 -0.3 -3.6
Note: numbers in red are IMF staff estimate.  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2017.
Macroeconomic and financial stability and the possibility of low inflation depend 
heavily on the hryvna’s exchange rate (Figure 2), which, in turn, is determined by the size of 
fiscal and external imbalances. While in 2015-17, the fiscal deficit was reduced and the huge 
quasi-fiscal deficit practically eliminated2 the public debt-to-GDP level more than doubled, 
reaching over 80 percent of GDP in 2016 (partly this was the effect of depreciation of the 
1 In December 2016, 46.0 percent of total bank deposits and 49.3 percent of total loans in Ukraine were denominated 
in foreign currency (IMF, 2017b, Table 6, p. 38). In addition, much of the population and small businesses keep a 
large part of their financial assets in foreign currency (mainly US dollars). 
2 The quasi-fiscal deficit was generated mainly by the deficit of the national gas company Naftogaz, as a result of 
keeping natural gas tariffs for households well below cost-recovery level until spring 2016. 
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hryvna). With such heavy indebtedness, it will be difficult for Ukraine to return to private 
debt market financing at a reasonable price after 2018, as assumed in the IMF Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF) programme, accepted in March 2015 (IMF, 2015). Furthermore, the 
reduction and rescheduling of the government liabilities to private bondholders negotiated 
in 2015 as part of the conditionality of the EFF programme have made such a return even 
more problematic. Consequently, Ukraine’s public debt sustainability will depend, most 
likely, on continuation of official external assistance for many years to come.
Figure 2: Exchange rate of hryvna (UAH/$100), 2014-17
Source: https://bank.gov.ua/control/en/curmetal/currency/search/form/period?startPeriod=31.12.2013&endPeriod=31.08.2017&char-
Code=169&step=daily&outer=table.
Figure 3: Net inflows to Ukraine of foreign direct investment (inward minus 
outward investment), $ millions
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
There are similar challenges in terms of balance of payments. Although the high current 
account deficit of the Yanukovych era was reduced to almost zero in 2015, it grew again in 
2016 when the economy started to recover. In principle, a moderate current account deficit 
is a normal phenomenon in an emerging-market economy, on the basis that it can be 
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financed by net capital inflows on a sustainable basis. Unfortunately, meeting this con-
dition has proved problematic for Ukraine. Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
remain modest (in 2015-16, they were largely targeted to bank recapitalisation), reflecting 
geopolitical and domestic political uncertainty and the ongoing poor business climate 
(Figure 3). 
In the coming years, Ukraine’s balance-of-payments sustainability might depend on the con-
tinuation of official external assistance, as in the case of fiscal accounts. The recorded increase 
in the NBU’s gross international reserves (Figure 3) happened largely thanks to disbursement of 
the subsequent tranches of the IMF loans. In summer 2017, reserves were equal to 3.6 months 
of imports –three months is usually considered the minimum level for uninterrupted trade 
transactions. The NBU’s net international reserves are much lower – about $5 billion. 
The NBU only partly removed restrictions that were introduced at the end of 2013 on cur-
rent account transactions. The restrictions proved most painful for small and medium sized 
enterprises. Large enterprises have various means of circumventing them. 
2.2 Rehabilitation of the banking sector
In parallel with the balance-of-payments and currency crises, Ukraine has suffered from 
a systemic banking crisis. Many Ukrainian banks, state-owned and private, have faced the 
risk of insolvency as result of the devaluation of the hryvna, imprudent lending practices, 
including large-scale connected lending to enterprises owned by major shareholders (such 
as Privatbank – see below), losses arising from the annexation of Crimea and large parts 
of Donbas, and deep recession. Since the summer of 2014, the government of Ukraine and 
NBU, with the support of the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) have engaged in a wholesale restructuring, rehabilitation and, in 
many cases, revoking of the licenses of those commercial banks that did not have sufficient 
capital adequacy ratios or conform with other prudential norms. Nationalisation of the largest 
Ukrainian bank – Privatbank, owned by the politically influential businessmen Ihor Kolo-
moysky and Gennady Bogolyubov – in December 2016 was the most spectacular step in this 
process (Olearchuk, 2017). 
While measures taken in this field helped to head off the sudden collapse of the entire 
banking system and improved the prospects of a credit recovery in the future, substantial 
fiscal costs were involved: 2.3 percent of GDP in 2015, 5.4 percent of GDP in 2016, and a 
further 3.6 percent of GDP in 2017 (IMF, 2017, Table 2b, p. 7). This still might not be the entire 
bill: the situation in many banks remains fragile with high and increasing ratios of non-per-
forming loans (NPLs) and continuous large open foreign-exchange positions. 
Banking sector stability in Ukraine will depend, to a large degree, on the relative stability 
of the hryvna. Even if Ukrainian banks follow prudential practices in their foreign exchange 
operations by avoiding open foreign-exchange positions, their unhedged clients will remain 
vulnerable to any new round of deeper hryvna depreciation. 
2.3 Reform of the natural gas sector
Reform of the gas sector represents a promising story mainly thanks to the courageous decision 
of the government of prime minister Volodymyr Groysman to accelerate adjustment of natural 
gas and district heating tariffs to the full cost-recovery level in May 2016 (it was originally 
planned to happen a year later). Furthermore, a half-yearly automatic tariff adjustment 
mechanism was introduced to prevent a return to natural gas subsidisation in the future. These 
moves facilitated fiscal consolidation in 2016-17, elimination of the major source of systemic 
corruption and the stopping of natural gas imports from Russia in 2016. Economic room was 
also created for the restructuring of Naftogaz, including the unbundling of transmission from 
production and distribution. Nonetheless, the sustainability of those reforms again depends on 
the stability of the hryvna exchange rate. In case of any abrupt hryvna depreciation, there would 
be the political temptation to prevent its pass-through to domestic gas tariffs and, therefore, 
to return to direct or indirect subsidisation of natural gas prices. Even without currency 
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depreciation, there is political reluctance to allow the half-yearly tariff adjustment mechanism 
to work. For example, a natural gas tariff increase was scheduled for 1 October 2017 – by 18.8 
percent because of higher import prices – but the Cabinet of Ministers rejected Naftogaz’s 
proposal on this. 
Furthermore, structural and institutional reforms in the gas sector are only in their initial 
stage and face continued risks of political reversal (Polityuk and Zinets, 2017). 
2.4 Trade reorientation
Loss of political control over Crimea and part of the Donbas region, combined with Russian 
trade sanctions, were a heavy blow to Ukrainian trade. Figure 3 shows the dramatic decline in 
Ukraine’s exports and imports after 2013. 
Russian trade sanctions against Ukraine started already in 2013 when the then Ukrainian 
leaders (president Viktor Yanukovych and prime minister Mykola Azarov) considered signing 
the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, which included the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine. Russian sanctions escalated during 
2014 and 2015 leading to unilateral termination by Russia on 1 January 2016 of the bilateral 
Russia-Ukraine free-trade agreement within the Commonwealth of Independent States, in 
reaction to the entry into force of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA.
Figure 4: Ukraine: total exports and imports of goods, € millions, 2005-15
Source: Eurostat (2017), Tables 1 and 2.
These shocks led to a substantial reorientation of Ukraine’s trade geography. The share of 
Ukraine’s total exports going to Russia went down from 26.1 percent in 2010 to 12.7 percent in 
2015 (Table 2) and to 9.9 percent in 20163. Respectively, the share of total Ukrainian imports 
coming from Russia went down from 36.5 percent in 2010 to 20 percent in 2015 and 13.1 
percent in 2016. At same time, the share Ukrainian exports going to the EU increased from 
25.5 percent in 2010 to 34.1 percent in 2015 and 37.2 percent in 2016. The figures for imports 
were 31.5 percent in 2010, 40.9 percent in 2015 and 43.7 percent in 2016. The share of China in 
Ukrainian trade also increased though to a lesser extent (Table 2). 
3 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/113459.htm, accessed 20 September 2017. 
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Table 2: Ukraine: exports and imports of goods to/from selected partners, % of total 
exports and imports, 2010 and 2015
Indicator
EU28 Russia China
2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015
Exports 25.5 34.1 26.1 12.7 2.6 6.3
Imports 31.5 40.9 36.5 20.0 7.7 10.1
Source: Eurostat (2017), Tables 9 and 10.
In the coming years, the share of the EU in Ukrainian trade could further increase as a result 
of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA4. However, more time and domestic regula-
tory homework on the Ukrainian side is needed to fully grasp all the potential benefits of this 
agreement. 
To have a complete picture, one should also mention the politically-motivated decisions 
of the Ukrainian authorities that damaged trade and economic relations with Russia and the 
Ukrainian territories beyond their control. An economic blockade of the occupied part of 
Donbas was initiated spontaneously in early 2017 by Ukrainian battalions of volunteers and 
eventually backed by the president and government. This serves as the best example of such a 
wrong policy (Kostanyan and Remizov, 2017). 
Examples of similar decisions taken earlier included banning direct passenger flights 
between Russia and Ukraine in October 2015 (Rainfords, 2015), and the energy and transport 
blockade of Crimea in November 2015 (Olearchyk and Farchy, 2015). 
 2.5 Tax reform
Since 2016, the tax system has been simplified by replacing 67 different rates of social security 
contribution (SSC) with an average effective rate of 41 percent with a single rate of 22 percent, 
the introduction of proportional personal income tax of 18 percent (instead of previous two 
rates of 15 percent and 20 percent), and elimination of some other taxes of marginal fiscal 
importance (IMF, 2016a, Box 1, p. 11). 
While tax simplification should be seen as a progressive step helping to improve the 
business and investment climate and reduce sources of corruption, it has unfortunately not 
been free from populist pressures in the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) in favour of upfront 
reduction of the tax burden while disregarding fiscal constraints. As result, almost halving 
the SSC rate led to a revenue loss of 4 percentage points of GDP in 2016 (IMF, 2017a, Table 
2b, p. 34). This loss was only partly compensated for by elimination of the special VAT regime 
in agriculture (a significant improvement in the overall VAT architecture), higher excise and 
property taxes, and higher marginal taxes under the simplified regime for small taxpayers. 
In parallel, there has been a continuous effort to improve tax and custom administration 
by modernisation and reorganisation of the State Fiscal Service (SFS). The long-existing prob-
lem of the lack of automatic VAT refunds for exporters seems to have been solved. 
 2.6 Pension reform
The public pension system in Ukraine is among the most expensive and socially inefficient 
in the world. Public pension expenditure amounted to 17.2 percent of GDP in 2013. It went 
down to 13.4 percent of GDP in 2015 mainly as result of inflationary depreciation of pension 
benefits (IMF, 2017b, Table 3, p. 27) – hardly politically sustainable in the medium-to-long 
term. However, as result of the drastic reduction in the SSC rate (see section 2.5) the deficit 
of the Pension Fund of Ukraine increased to 6.3 percent of GDP in 2016. In 2017, there have 
been signs of increased Pension Fund revenues as a result of the doubling of the minimum 
wage and, therefore, reducing the shadow remuneration of labour. 
Apart from unfavourable demographic trends, it is the low retirement age, numerous 
4 See Dabrowski (2016) for an analysis of the content of the AA and DCFTA. 
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sectoral and occupational pension privileges, and underreporting of wages that are responsi-
ble for the high costs and the high deficit of the public pension system. Even after the pension 
reform of 2011, the statutory retirement age was 60 for men and 58 for women (it will increase 
gradually to 60 for women in 2021), with many groups of employees eligible for early retire-
ment at the age of 55 or even 50, and many enjoying higher pensions than the standard rates 
(IMF, 2017b). Those privileges were only marginally corrected in 2015 (Dabrowski, 2015). 
At the beginning of 2016, the number of pensioners in Ukraine exceeded 12 million, about 
27 percent of the population (IMF, 2017b, Table 1, p. 22). In the coming years and decades, the 
dependency ratio will further deteriorate because of unfavourable demographic trends unless 
the effective retirement age is increased and various privileged schemes are terminated. 
In June 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers submitted to the Rada a legislative proposal5 under 
which there would be a one-off revaluation of pension benefits (depreciated by the effect of 
high inflation – see above) and the introduction of a permanent pension indexation mecha-
nism (50 percent according to inflation and 50 percent according to the nominal increase in 
the average wage). The substantial fiscal costs of revaluation and future indexation would be 
compensated for by (i) use of a less generous formula in calculating new pension benefits; 
(ii) the elimination of professional pension privileges; and (iii) introduction of a minimum 
25-year period for paying SSC as a condition of retirement at age 606. This paying-in period 
will be gradually increased to 35 years in 2028. 
The proposed law is expected to enter into force in late 2017. At time of writing, it is diffi-
cult to assess its full short- and long-term fiscal consequences and its impact on the labour 
market. 
2.7 Stalled privatisation
There were no meaningful privatisation deals between 2014 and 2016, which slowed down 
restructuring in many sectors and private capital inflows, constrained public debt repayments 
and encouraged corruption and other predatory practices against state-owned (or partly 
state-owned) enterprises. In 2017, the State Property Fund started to sell state-owned utility 
companies, generating by the time of writing proceeds of about $100 million. 
In October 2016, the Ukrainian parliament extended the moratorium on the sale of 
agricultural land for another year, until 1 January 2018. The lack of an open private market for 
agricultural land is delaying the modernisation of the Ukrainian agriculture sector (Aslund, 
2017).
3 Institutional and political reforms
3.1 Constitutional order
Immediately after the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, Ukraine revisited 
the 2004 constitutional amendments that reduced the power of the president in favour of 
the Rada, mainly by granting the latter the authority to appoint and control the government, 
which was previously subordinated to the president7. While such constitutional changes can 
be considered positive from the point of view of reducing the risk of authoritarianism, the 
concrete amendments adopted hastily during the 2004 Orange Revolution were not necessar-
ily well designed and, therefore, proved dysfunctional in practice. 
5 See http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&pf3511=62088&pf35401=427169. 
6 The basic retirement age of 60 for both sexes is to remain unchanged.
7 In 2010, this amendment was nullified by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in a controversial ruling, which 
allowed Viktor Yanukovych to return to the pre-2004 presidential prerogatives. 
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Forming a parliamentary majority and a government, which is appointed by this majority, 
has become a lengthy and politically fragile process. Furthermore, the division of constitu-
tional prerogatives between the president and cabinet of ministers remains unclear, leading 
to frequent tensions. The collision of competences intensified in the situation of armed 
conflict, which naturally increased the power of the president as the supreme commander of 
the armed forces. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, formally an advisory 
body to the President, often de facto assumes the role of cabinet. Overall, the tensions within 
the executive branch of government do not help in the country’s governance and progress 
towards reform. 
There is little chance to change the constitution in this and other aspects (for example, 
regional and local self-government – see section 3.3) because of the absence of a constitu-
tional majority in the current term of the Rada (see sections 3.2 and 4).
3.2 Political parties and parliament
Political parties play a crucial role in all democracies. However, in Ukraine, similarly to many 
other post-communist countries, a stable system has not formed. After the Euromaidan, most 
of previous parties disappeared from the political scene8 and were replaced by new ones. 
However, these look fragile and might not survive the election cycle of 2018-19. 
Most current political parties were either formed or are supported by powerful business 
groups (oligarchs) and remain at least partly dependent on them. This is also the case for indi-
vidual members of parliament (MPs) who are financially supported by business ‘sponsors’, 
or even paid for endorsing or rejecting legislation. The legislative process is thus extremely 
corrupt and an easy target for capture by powerful lobby groups. To make things more com-
plicated, the largest parties are penetrated by several business groups, often with conflicting 
aims. 
Ukraine’s mixed electoral system in which half of the seats in parliament are distributed 
via a proportional representation system and half of MPs are elected in single-seat constitu-
encies based on first-past-the-post voting, further weakens political parties, helps oligarchs 
and other interest groups to elect their representatives, and encourages political corruption. 
Because of the weakness of Ukraine’s political parties, MPs from single-seat constituencies 
often owe greater allegiance to those who finance their campaigns than to their parties. Over-
all, in such circumstances, the cabinet of ministers, even if represents formally the parliamen-
tary majority, cannot count on party discipline in parliamentary voting. 
The frequent political stalemate in parliament is also enabled by the specific definition 
of ‘majority’ in the Ukrainian constitution. Unlike in many other countries, where a simple 
majority (with the quorum threshold of 50 percent of MPs taking part in the voting) is suffi-
cient to endorse a law, in Ukraine a majority consists of more than 50 percent of the consti-
tutional number of parliamentary seats, which is set at 450. Thus, at least 226 MPs must vote 
‘yes’. Constitutional changes require two thirds of MPs, or 301 votes, in favour. Any abstentions 
or non-votes by MPs (for example because of absence) are counted as ‘no’ votes. 
Furthermore, at the time of writing, the Rada has 27 empty seats (that is, there are only 
423 elected MPs) because it was not possible to conduct the 2014 parliamentary elections in 
Crimea and the occupied parts of Donbas. As a consequence, in practical terms, the majority 
rule requires ‘yes’ votes from 53.2 percent of the elected MPs for normal legislation, and 70.9 
percent for constitutional changes. 
Unfortunately, the current Rada is no less dependent on oligarchic interests than previous 
incarnations, and reform aimed at the elimination of existing deficiencies (for example, a 
return to the pre-2012 system of fully proportional representation based on open party lists) 
has been effectively blocked. One of the few innovations adopted in 2015 was the introduc-
8 The Fatherland (Batkivschina) party of twice-prime minister Yulia Timoshenko is the only one that survived the 
2013-14 events. 
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tion of state financing of political parties (Kosmehl and Umland, 2016). However, to have 
a positive impact on fighting political corruption, such a law should be supplemented by 
other legislation on, for example, the conduct of the mass media (largely owned by oligarchs) 
during election campaigns and effective enforcement of the already existing rules on financ-
ing political parties from private sources. 
3.3 Local and regional self-government
Since independence in 1991, the Ukrainian state has been excessively centralised with no 
genuine local and regional self-government. This was one of institutional legacies of the 
Soviet past when all key economic and administrative competencies were concentrated in 
Moscow. After the collapse of the USSR, these competencies were automatically taken over 
by the central institutions of the new Ukrainian state in Kyiv. Among others factors, political 
reluctance to devolve more powers to regional and local levels had its roots in the fear of the 
country’s territorial disintegration, a threat that partly materialised anyway in 2014 as a result 
of the Russian intervention. 
Since 2014, decentralisation has become the flagship policy goal of the new authorities but 
little has happened in practice. The draft constitutional changes of 2015 that were intended 
to open way for genuine local and regional self-government were halted in the Rada after the 
first reading, largely because of opposition to the special status of Eastern Donbas (currently 
outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities), which was part of the same legislative pack-
age. In the unchanged constitutional and legal environment, the 2015 local election made no 
difference in terms of forming local authorities more responsive to the population’s needs. 
Instead of wholesale reform, some incremental changes have been introduced, such as 
voluntary amalgamation of the lowest territorial units hromadas (most of them being too 
weak to benefit from serious devolution of power) and some degree of fiscal decentralisation, 
mainly related to education and healthcare (Jarabik and Yesmukhanova, 2017).
3.4 Public administration, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies
The notoriously poor business and investment climate in Ukraine (Dabrowski, 2014) has its 
deep institutional roots in the predatory behaviour of state apparatus, which has remained 
largely unreformed since the Soviet era. Unfortunately, reform progress in this field since 2014 
has been patchy and the most serious steps still await implementation. 
While there has been a serious effort to improve the professional quality of senior posi-
tions in government and the central administration, including attracting Ukrainian expats 
and foreign specialists on a long-term basis (unfortunately, many of them have already left), 
the structure of government, the number of ministries and various central agencies, and 
public official headcounts have changed very little. On the regional and local levels, change 
has been even more problematic because of the blocking of self-governance reform (see 
section 3.3). Public servants remain poorly paid, making them prone to corrupt practices 
and resulting in recruitment of low-quality candidates. On the other hand, unless the public 
administration is seriously restructured and the overall number of staff is cut, there will be no 
fiscal room for higher salaries (see IMF, 2017a, p. 15).
The various law-enforcement agencies have been another source of harassment of both 
the business community and ordinary citizens. Again, reforms in this sphere have been only 
partial so far. They have concentrated on formation of the new traffic police and reforming tax 
enforcement (which is still ongoing at time of writing) and the tax and customs administra-
tion (see section 2.5). Reform of other police formations is less advanced, even if the previous 
militia staff members have had to pass through verification processes and many have been 
replaced by new functionaries. The Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeki Ukrainy – 
SBU) remains unreformed and uses its broad national security and investigation prerogatives 
to harass business. Reform of the General Prosecutor’s Office is only just starting. 
The annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas has triggered a far-reaching reform 
of the Ukrainian army – a process that has to continue in the coming years to improve the 
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country’s external security. 
In 2016, a package of constitutional and legislative changes initiated the reform of the 
judicial branch of government (Carnegie, 2017), with the ultimate goal of strengthening the 
rule of law and radically improving contract enforcement and protection of property rights. 
The structure of the Ukrainian court system was simplified (from four to three tiers) and 
merit-based recruitment of judges was initiated. However, as the experience of other transi-
tion and developing countries demonstrates, building a professional and impartial judiciary 
free from political interference, pressure of business interests and corruption, takes many 
years and involves the risk of derailment or even reversal. Ukraine is only at the beginning of 
this process and a lot of political determination will be required to continue it in the years to 
come. 
3.5 Fighting corruption
Corruption is perceived as Ukraine’s biggest social disease. It harms economic growth, under-
mines society’s trust in public institutions and public services and, therefore, undermines the 
very foundations of the Ukrainian state and political system9. This perception is firmly backed 
by various international rankings, for example, the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index, which in 2016 put Ukraine in distant 131st position out of 176 countries 
ranked10, a small improvement compared to 2013 when it occupied 144th position out of 175 
countries ranked11. Hence, fighting corruption has become one of the key demands of both 
the Ukrainian public and external donors such as the EU, IMF, World Bank, EBRD, USAID and 
others. 
Several specific institutional and policy steps have been taken since 2015 to satisfy these 
expectations. These include, for example, creating the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of 
Ukraine (NABU), the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), staffing them 
via open and merit-based recruitment processes, introducing e-declarations of assets for 
public officials and an electronic public procurement system. 
The main question concerns the balance between policies aimed at the elimination of the 
sources of corruption and fighting the symptoms of corruption. While some important steps 
towards eliminating systemic sources of corruption have been taken (such as elimination of 
natural gas subsidies, the new electronic public procurement system, budget financing of 
political parties, strengthening banking supervision and revoking banking licenses in cases of 
fraudulent banking practices) many others wait for implementation. These include intro-
ducing an open and transparent privatisation process, further reform of the energy sector, 
elimination of tax exemptions and foreign exchange restrictions, reform of the public admin-
istration, law enforcement agencies and judiciary, simplifying business regulations, enforcing 
rules on the private financing of political parties, reform of the electoral law, including the 
role of the private media in election campaigns, tightening procedures related to granting 
disability benefits, and many others. 
One of the biggest challenges concerns the role of large business groups (oligarchs) in 
Ukraine’s economy and politics. On one hand, their strength and the plurality of their eco-
nomic and political interests helped to protect country from falling into full authoritarianism 
in the critical junctions of post-independence history (2004 and 2013-14). On the other hand, 
they have created serious obstacles to reform by trying to defend their interests. 
Immediately after the Euromaidan, the political influence of some oligarchs further 
increased thanks to their role in stabilising the domestic political situation and fighting exter-
nal aggression. The prominent example was Ihor Kolomoysky, who was nominated as the 
governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region in 2014 and played the leading role in organising and 
financing battalions of volunteers to defend the Donbas region.
9 For a deeper analysis, see for example IMF, 2017b, pp. 3-18; Carnegie, 2016.
10 See https://www.transparency.org/country/UKR.
11 See http://files.transparency.org/content/download/700/3007/file/2013_CPIBrochure_EN.pdf. 
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One may hope that if reforms aimed at creating an open and competitive economic and 
political system progress enough, they will undermine the monopolistic positions of the larg-
est business empires and, thus, the sources of their political rents and influence. 
4 The political economy and politics of  
Ukrainian reforms
The dramatic political developments of 2014-15 and the need to defend the country’s inde-
pendence and territorial integrity led to an unprecedented mobilisation of Ukrainian society. 
It was a unique window of political opportunity to overhaul both the political and economic 
systems. Regrettably, this opportunity has only been partly grasped. Almost all of 2014 was 
spent on two election campaigns (the presidential election in May 2014 and parliamentary 
elections in October 2014) and the lengthy process of formation of a governing coalition. The 
new government emerged only in December 2014. 
Then, 2015 and the beginning of 2016 were marked by continuous political tensions and 
rivalry between president Petro Poroshenko and prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Fortu-
nately, those tensions did not reach the point of those between president Viktor Yushchenko 
and prime minister Yulia Timoshenko in 2005, immediately after the Orange Revolution, 
but they were serious enough to slow down the process of reform. Ultimately, the cabinet of 
ministers resigned in March 2016 and a new government was formed under prime minister 
Volodymyr Groysman in May 2016, representing the same political party as the President. 
The formation of Groysman’s government diminished tensions within the executive 
branch of government but at the cost of losing majority support in the Rada. In fact, this 
majority (which constituted an unprecedented 80 percent of all MPs in December 2014) grad-
ually disappeared over 2015 and early 2016. The Yatsenyuk’s government also experienced 
growing difficulties in mobilising MPs votes in favour of its legislative initiatives. To a great 
degree, this was the result of penetration of political parties by special interest groups (see 
section 3.2) and the double loyalty of several MPs (to their party and business ‘sponsors’). As 
the popularity of both the president and the two parties that form the government (the Block 
of Petro Poroshenko and the Popular Front) plummeted during 2017, most other political 
parties preferred to stay in opposition to their policies and gain popular support in prepara-
tion for the next election round. In practical terms, this means waiting for the outcome of the 
2019 election, unless snap parliamentary elections are organised earlier, or a new majority 
coalition is formed in the Rada. 
A comparison between the developments in Ukraine from 2014-17 and those in the 
successful reformers of central Europe or the Baltic region in the early 1990s, or even to the 
successful deregulation and anti-corruption reforms in Georgia after the ‘Rose’ revolution 
in December 2003, leads to rather pessimistic conclusions. As previously (in 1994, 2000 and 
2005-06), Ukraine has experienced a deficit in reform leadership both in political and pro-
fessional terms. Such a deficit cannot be made up by importing even the most experienced 
policymakers from abroad (as was tried in the last three years). 
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5  The role of external assistance
Confronted with the existential threat to Ukraine’s existence, the international community 
offered it broad-based political, economic and security support. Limiting our further analysis 
to the economic field and international support for economic and institutional reforms, we 
focus on two key players: the IMF and the EU. 
The IMF supported Ukraine with two programmes: the 24-month SBA in April 2014 of 
SDR10.976 billion (800 percent of Ukraine’s quota in the IMF) replaced by the four-year EFF 
in March 2015 of SDR12.348 billion (900 percent of quota). This was substantial support 
offered quickly at the critical time of greatest market distress. However, questions could be 
raised about the programmes’ macroeconomic assumptions (too optimistic, as indirectly 
confirmed in the internal ex-post evaluation of the SBA; see IMF, 2016b) and soft conditional-
ity (see Dabrowski, 2014 and 2015, for details). 
As result, neither IMF programme guaranteed the country’s return to the private debt 
market, one of the key conditions of the so-called exceptional access to the Fund’s resources, 
which justified the size of financial assistance and its fast-track disbursement. 
Beyond these general shortcomings, there are questions about the programmes’ priorities. 
This concerns, for example, the recommendation to adopt an inflation targeting framework 
in 2014-15, at the time of greatest macroeconomic and financial turbulence when the NBU 
did not enjoy full legal and political independence. Debt restructuring was another contro-
versial measure because it absorbed the political and administrative energy of the Ministry of 
Finance for most of 2015 and prevented Ukraine’s access to the private debt market. Contrary 
to its Articles of Agreement, the IMF did not effectively oppose continuous current account 
restrictions in Ukraine. In the area of anti-corruption policy, the focus has been fighting the 
symptoms of corruption rather than elimination of corruption’s deep systemic causes. Instead 
of pushing for establishment of the special anti-corruption court, conditionality should 
encourage faster reform of criminal justice. 
In 2014-15, the European Commission offered Ukraine three low-interest loans totalling 
€3.4 billion under the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) scheme, the highest ever amount for 
a non-member country12. The EU MFAs always provide supplementary financing to the IMF 
loans. The last tranche of MFA III, amounting to €600 million, waits at the time of writing for 
disbursement, along with the remaining tranches of the IMF EFF loan. 
Of course, the EU’s role has gone much further than the MFA and other aid programmes, 
including technical assistance. One should mention the signing and ratification (in July 2017 
after more than a year of uncertainty created by the advisory referendum in the Netherlands) 
of the EU-Ukraine AA, including its DCFTA components. In July 2017, this was supplemented 
by EU unilateral trade preferences, such as additional tariff-free import quotas for agricultural 
products and full removal of import duties on several industrial products, granted to Ukraine 
for a three-year period (Council of the European Union, 2017). 
Furthermore, since June 2017, holders of Ukrainian electronic passports can travel to the 
EU without visas, which increases support within Ukraine for EU-Ukraine cooperation, and is 
helpful in facilitating business contacts. 
Nevertheless, not all EU policy initiatives and aid conditionality were optimally designed. 
For example, postponing until 1 January 2016 the entry into force of the DCFTA, in order 
to avoid Russian trade sanctions against Ukraine, did not achieve its goal, while delaying 
implementation of this agreement by Ukraine. Similarly to the IMF, the focus on fighting 
the symptoms of corruption rather than its causes, and pushing for spectacular high-profile 
anti-corruption cases, can produce undesirable political consequences – it might be tempting 
to use anti-corruption investigation against political adversaries, for example. 
12 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-economic-re-
lations/enlargement-and-neighbouring-countries/neighbouring-countries-eu/neighbourhood-countries/ukraine_en. 
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6  Policy lessons and the way ahead
Without any doubt the process of reforming the Ukrainian economy and state remains unfin-
ished, even if the overall balance looks more optimistic in comparison with the situation in 
the period following the Orange Revolution of 2004. Unfortunately, several important policy 
areas, sectors and institutions have not been touched by reforms or have been reformed 
only partly. Because reforms are far from complete, the economic and political changes 
introduced so far face a sustainability risk arising from their incompleteness, diminishing 
domestic political support and the forthcoming 2018-19 election campaign. Internationally, 
there are some symptoms of ‘Ukraine fatigue’, resulting from a perception that reform and the 
eradication of corruption in this country go too slowly (see for example Ukrayinska Pravda, 
2017). This might translate into diminishing political support and aid flows, especially from 
the major donors such as the US and EU. 
Another question is whether reform to date has created the ‘critical’ mass to generate the 
rapid economic growth Ukraine so badly needs. Some experts remain optimistic (Aslund, 
2017) but the IMF forecasts a rather modest recovery of 2 percent in 2017 and 3.2 percent in 
2018. International metal prices have rebounded somewhat in 2017, and if this continues 
in longer term, it might help with faster growth and the relaxation of both fiscal and bal-
ance-of-payments constraints. 
However, one cannot exclude a pessimistic scenario under which a combination of 
continuing conflict in Donbas, domestic political uncertainty and lack of substantial improve-
ment in the business climate might lock Ukraine into a low growth/stagnation scenario for 
several years to come.  
The main lesson from the post-Euromaidan reform experience is that time is the most 
precious political asset. Once the political window of opportunity for serious reform is open, 
as happened in Ukraine in 2014-15 when there was ‘revolutionary’ enthusiasm and a need to 
rally against an existential threat posed by external intervention, it should be used as inten-
sively and effectively as possible. Whether this happens depends on the quality of the political 
and professional leadership of the reform process. 
References
Aslund, A. (2017) ‘Ukraine ready for economic liftoff soon’, Kyiv Post, 16 June, available at https://www.
kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/anders-aslund-ukraine-ready-economic-liftoff-soon.html 
Carnegie (2016) Between Victory and Betrayal: How to Move Ukraine’s Anticorruption Reforms 
Forward, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 26 July, available at http://
carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/26/between-victory-and-betrayal-how-to-move-ukraine-s-anticorruption-
reforms-forward-pub-64180 
Carnegie (2017) Ukraine Reform Monitor: April 2017, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington DC, 19 April, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/19/ukraine-reform-monitor-
april-2017-pub-68700 
Council of the European Union (2017) ‘Ukraine: Council adopts temporary trade preferences’, press 
release, 17 July, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/17-agri-
ukraine-trade-prefrences/ 
Dabrowski, M. (2007) ‘Ukraine at a Crossroads’, CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 350, available at 
http://www.case-research.eu/sites/default/files/publications/17209093_S%20and%20A_350_Dabrowski_0.
pdf
Dabrowski, M. (2014) ‘Ukraine: Can meaningful reform come out of conflict?’ Policy Contribution 
2014/08, Bruegel, available at http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/pc_2014_08_
Ukraine.pdf
15 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚24 | September 2017
Dabrowski, M. (2015) ‘The harsh reality of Ukraine’s fiscal arithmetic’, Policy Contribution 2015/07, 
Bruegel, available at http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/pc_2015_07_Ukraine-.
pdf 
Dabrowski, M. (2016) ‘EU Association Agreement could help Ukraine to reform’, Bruegel Blog, 16 March, 
available at http://bruegel.org/2016/03/eu-association-agreement-could-help-ukraine-to-reform/
Eurostat (2017) International trade for the European Neighbourhood Policy-East countries. 2016 edition, 
13 February, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4031688/7873729/KS-01-17-074-EN-N.pdf/
fdb394a4-5d33-487e-8314-83ec6abbd63e 
IMF (2014) ‘Ukraine: Request for Stand-by Arrangement—Staff Report; Supplement; Staff Statement; 
Press Release; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine’, Country Report No. 14/106, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14106.pdf
IMF (2015) ‘Ukraine: Request for Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility and 
Cancellation of Stand-By Arrangement—Staff Report; Press Release; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for Ukraine’, Country Report No. 15/69, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2015/cr1569.pdf 
IMF (2016a) ‘Ukraine : Second Review Under the Extended Fund Facility and Requests for Waivers of 
Non-Observance of Performance Criteria, Rephasing of Access and Financing Assurances; Review-
Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine’, Country Report No. 
16/319, available at http://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2016/_cr16319.ashx 
IMF (2016b) ‘Ukraine: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2014 Stand-By Arrangement’, 
Country Report No. 16/320, available at http://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-
pdf/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/_cr16320.ashx 
IMF (2017a) ‘Ukraine: 2016 Article IV Consultation and third review under the Extended Arrangement, 
Requests for a Waiver of Non-Observance of a Performance Criterion, Waiver of Applicability, 
Rephasing of Access and Financing Assurances, Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by 
the Executive Director for Ukraine’, Country Report No. 17/83, available at http://www.imf.org/~/media/
Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr1783.ashx 
IMF (2017b) ‘Ukraine: Selected Issues’, Country Report No 17/84, available at http://www.imf.org/~/media/
Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr1784.ashx 
Jarabik, B., and Y. Yesmukhanova (2017) Ukraine’s Slow Struggle for Decentralization, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 8 March, available at http://carnegieendowment.
org/2017/03/08/ukraine-s-slow-struggle-for-decentralization-pub-68219?m 
Kosmehl, M., and A. Umland (2016) ‘Ukraine Introduces State Financing for Political Parties: A Promising 
Reform or Cosmetic Change?’ Harvard International Review, 30 August, available at http://hir.harvard.
edu/article/?a=13876 
Kostanyan, H., and A. Remizov (2017) ‘The Donbas Blockade: Another blow to the Minsk peace 
process’, CEPS Working Document No. 2017/08, June, available at https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/
WD2017-08%20The%20Donbas%20blockade.pdf 
Olearchyk, R. (2017) ‘Two Ukraine oligarchs face threat of asset seizure’, Financial Times, 3 July 
Olearchyk, R., and J. Farchy (2015) ‘Ukraine imposes economic blockade on a blacked-out Crimea’, Financial 
Times, 23 
Polityuk, P., and N. Zinets (2017) ‘EBRD says reform of Ukraine’s Naftogaz in danger of unravelling’, 
Reuters, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-naftogaz-ebrd-idUSL8N1HJ27T 
Rainfords, S. (2015) ‘Ban due on direct flights between Russia and Ukraine’, BBC News, 24 October, 
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34622665 
Ukrayinska Pravda (2017) ‘David Lipton, IMF: Ukraine risks reversing’, 15 September, available at http://
www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2017/09/15/7155220/ 
